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# National Intelligence Bulletin

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#### **CYPRUS**

The Turkish Cypriot declaration yesterday establishing a separate state pending agreement on a proposed Cyprus federation has prompted the Greek and Greek Cypriot governments to refer the issue to the UN Security Council. President Makarios called the Turkish Cypriot action a "very severe blow" to the talks.

Turkish Cypriot negotiator Denktash, who is president of the new federal state, conveyed his proposals for a settlement to Greek Cypriot negotiator Clerides and requested another session of the intercommunal talks for February 17. The Turkish Cypriot proposals are certain to call for a biregional federation with a weak central government. The proposed Turkish Cypriot region's size and share of the island's resources are likely to be substantially larger than would be commensurate with the Turkish Cypriots' share of the population, 18 percent.


Turkish Cypriot actions apparently are a response to the Greek Cypriot position paper submitted earlier in the week. It called for a multiregional federation and a strong central government in which the total area controlled by Turkish Cypriots would approximate their percentage of the population. Yesterday's moves by the Turkish Cypriots may be an attempt to take back the initiative and place the onus on the Greek side for breaking off negotiations.

The Greek Cypriot proposals were intended to force the Turkish Cypriots to deal with the major issues at stake and provide some clues as to whether a solution can emerge from the talks. They reflect President Makarios' belief that the Cyprus problem will fade from the limelight, and that international pressure on the Turkish side to make concessions will lessen if the talks drag on inconclusively. Makarios has been pessimistic about the outcome of the talks for some time and had threatened to internationalize the issue if no progress were forthcoming by the end of this month. Proclamation

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of the separate Turkish Cypriot federal state may convince him to abandon the talks altogether, but the Greek side will probably want to examine the Turkish Cypriot position paper closely before making such a move.

In the meantime, Turkish troops in the Nicosia area were placed on alert in anticipation of a possible Greek Cypriot reaction to the Turkish Cypriot declaration of autonomy. While this appears unlikely, demonstrations could occur within the Greek Cypriot sector and threaten foreign diplomatic missions.



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#### CAMBODIA

All surface lines of communication to Phnom Penh are now closed, leaving Pochentong airfield as the government's only reliable point of entry for essential supplies.

The airfield presents a clearly defined target for Khmer Communist gunners, and the prospects for increased attacks against the field will grow as airlift operations expand. With an expected doubling of contract airlift sorties from 10 to 20 per day and the projected need for perhaps as many as 40 to meet minimum essential requirements—if the Mekong remains closed—Pochentong will become a more lucrative target. Assuming an increase to 40 sorties per day, there will be a high risk of aircraft damage, as well as the real possibility of aircrew casualties.

An estimated 13,000 to 15,000 enemy troops are located north, west, and southwest of the airfield.

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Communist forces are equipped with 107-mm. and B-40 rockets as well as 60-mm. and 82-mm. mortars. They have also used 105-mm. howitzers in the past. They are known to have had at least one 37-mm. AAA weapon in early 1974 and also have a variety of automatic weapons. The Cambodian Communists probably do not have the SA-7 Grail surface-to-air missile in their inventory.

It is believed Communist forces have the capability to:

--Intensify 107-mm. rocket fire and possibly initiate 105-mm. howitzer fire against Pochentong.

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- --Mount a coordinated attack against Pochentong if a favorable attack position can be gained.
- --Conduct sapper attacks against the airfield. Although unlikely now, the possibility of such attacks cannot be discounted.
- --Employ automatic weapons against arriving and departing aircraft.

To counter these actions, the Cambodian army has between 10,000 and 12,000 combat troops within a 25-kilometer radius of Pochentong; and the army's best unit-the 3rd Division--is located near the airfield. Physical security within the airfield has been integrated into the overall ground security plan for Phnom Penh.

The Cambodian 7th Division is northwest of the airfield, but it has suffered serious losses and is vulnerable. The effectiveness of tactical air and artillery support for defense is contingent on the availability of ammunition. Should the Communists launch a concerted attack, government forces may be forced to relinquish ground and tighten their perimeter. If Pochentong airfield becomes seriously threatened, the government could withdraw additional units from provincial enclaves to help in its defense.

If a large-scale airlift into Pochentong airfield becomes a reality, Communist rocket attacks against the field should be expected to mount in intensity. A growing accumulation of aircraft at the terminal as well as fuel and ammunition along the apron will greatly increase the airfield's vulnerability and its importance as a target.

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#### SOUTH KOREA

With 73 percent of the ballots in his favor, President Pak won the national vote of confidence for which the referendum on February 12 was organized. The South Korean political stage is now set for a series of initiatives designed to strengthen the government's hand in coping with its domestic opponents.

It is still unclear exactly how Pak intends to proceed.


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Pak's victory

statement spoke of a "nonpartisan national political system." This appears to be a reference to a rumored conversion of the party/cabinet system of the past 12 years into a kind of national front--a nonpartisan coalition of political and functional groups deemed reliable by the government.

There have also been reports that Pak might soon release some political prisoners and authorize a new government dialogue with the opposition.

If Pak's opponents once again take to the streets, however, the government hints of a "crackdown." At the moment, many South Korean officials appear to find this the more likely contingency.



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#### THAILAND

Thailand has moved a step closer to the formation of a new government as a result of a National Assembly vote endorsing Democrat leader Seni Pramot as prime minister. Seni's first task will be to put together a coalition that can win a vote of confidence in the assembly. Such a test could come by early next week.

The voting yesterday suggests that, although Seni may succeed in forming a government, it could be a minority one. He received only the minimum number of votes. If his efforts to negotiate a coalition bog down once again, the initiative will shift to the conservative bloc-many of whose members abstained from yesterday's voting when it became apparent that Seni would come out on top.

Seni will have to overcome some significant obstacles if he is to form a stable coalition. Much will depend on whether he can gain the support of the conservative Thai Nation Party, the Democrats' primary political rival in the maneuvering to form a government this past week. There is some evidence, however, that the Thai Nation Party may yet be amenable to a final overture from Seni.

Seni's difficulties, including his narrow margin of victory as front runner in yesterday's assembly voting, underscore the fragile nature of Thailand's newly adopted parliamentary system. No personality enjoys sufficient support to become the obvious choice for prime minister. If Seni gets in, one of his more significant problems will be to gain the confidence of the business and military elite that has worked hard behind the scenes to block his effort to form a government. This group, led by army commander Krit Siwara, remains a powerful political force both inside and out of the parliament. Krit, in particular, is suspicious of Seni, fearing that he will attempt to slash the military's budget and otherwise restrict its interests.

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#### SPAIN

The third round of negotiations between the US and Spain concluded on a positive note earlier this week, although little progress was made in reaching agreement on concrete issues.

For the first time, the head of the Spanish delegation appeared to accept US arguments that a US security guarantee was not possible, and he agreed to broaden the discussion beyond this item. Previously, the Spaniards had said that, without agreement on a guarantee, they would not go on to other matters of prime interest to the US, such as the negotiation of base facilities.

The Spaniards showed particular interest in prospects for developing a combined military planning group, which they may be beginning to view as a substitute for a security guarantee. They proposed putting US facilities on a new footing based on a defense "partnership," including combined planning to meet an agreed threat, rather than payments in cash and military equipment. Differences arose over the question of a command function that the Spaniards want for the proposed planning group; this will be discussed during the next round in Washington next month.

The Spaniards did not raise the issue of US support of Moroccan claims to the Spanish enclaves on the Moroccan Mediterranean coast. The reassurances extended to the Spaniards last week that the Moroccans would not have US support may have prevented this issue from clouding the negotiations.

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#### TURKEY

Turkey's plans to explore for oil in the Aegean have been frustrated for now by the owners of the Norwegian research ship Longva, who have refused to allow it to operate in disputed areas.

The Turkish government has announced that it has canceled the Longva's contract because of the owners' noncompliance with instructions. Energy Minister Isil told the Turkish senate that the government had previously ordered seismographic equipment and that if no other foreign ship will take the contract to explore in the Aegean, Turkey will equip one of its own vessels and proceed on its own.

The Turks are angry over this development, claiming that the Greek government put intense pressure on the Norwegians. A Turkish Foreign Ministry official remarked that the Greek efforts had been unwise because the alternative to using the Longva would be to send in a Turkish naval vessel, which would increase the risk of an incident.

Turkey does not have a ship equipped to conduct the type of operations the Longva was scheduled to do, and it is likely to take some time to outfit one for the job. Unless the Turks decide to show the flag in the disputed areas of the Aegean by sending in a ship with only limited research capabilities, the delay will give Turkish and Greek diplomats more time to address the issue. The foreign ministers of the two countries are expected to meet on the subject to determine the specific questions that will be referred to the International Court of Justice. A date for the meeting has not yet been set.


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#### FRANCE - MALAGASY REPUBLIC

A group of French warships led by the aircraft carrier Clemenceau reportedly was steaming toward the troubled island of Madagascar yesterday. The latest reports indicate the situation in the capital remains confused, but that no new outbreak of violence has occurred elsewhere on the island.

According to the French minister of cooperation with African countries, the ships were being sent to the island to reassure some 38,000 French citizens living there, rather than as a show of force. The French may want to be in a position to evacuate citizens in case the situation should deteriorate markedly.

A French naval task force, led by the Clemenceau, has been in the Indian Ocean since last October. A detachment of marines, trained in quick intervention tactics, reportedly is aboard the carrier. These marines could be used if French citizens or interests are threatened.



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USSR

The Soviet Union's newest nuclear-powered icebreaker, the Arktika, is the most heavily gun-armed surface ship built by the Soviets since 1960. Since it does not display standard merchant stack markings and is heavily armed, the Arktika will probably be operated by the Soviet navy. If so, the icebreaker, will be the first nuclear-powered surface ship in the navy.

The 25,000-ton ship is powered by two reactors that are reported to generate 75,000 shaft horsepower, about 50 percent more than the two-reactor system used by the Lenin--the Soviets' only other nuclear-powered icebreaker.

Construction of another nuclear-powered icebreaker, to be named Antarktika, began last year at Leningrad's Admiralty Yard. Assuming a schedule similar to that of the Arktika, it could become operational in 1978.


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#### FOR THE RECORD

USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev yesterday made his first public appearance since December 24. Last night, he joined Premier Kosygin and Foreign Minister Gromyko for talks with visiting British Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign Secretary Callaghan at the Kremlin. Brezhnev did not welcome Wilson at the airport ceremonies earlier in the day, but this was not required by protocol. Despite his 51 days out of public view, Brezhnev showed no unusual physical problems and acted as he usually does in such situations for the media.

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